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Abstract 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are frequently 
renegotiated. The reason is that these long-term contracts 
(of over 30 years) require major investments and therefore 
are necessarily incomplete. Thus, research perceives the 
renegotiation of PPPs as their biggest pitfall. The abnormal 
occurrence of renegotiations leads to low efficiency and 
potential problems in this type of organizational choice. This 
study addresses the contractual incompleteness and the 
effect of renegotiations by using Portuguese PPPs. The use of 
mixed methods (a qualitative approach using fsQCA and a 
quantitative one) provides a deeper knowledge of the 
conditions that can cause renegotiations. The results show 
that investment, debt, type of shareholder, and type of 
payment have a strong effect on the occurrence or absence 
of renegotiations. Regulatory agencies responsible for both 
the creation and the renegotiation of PPPs must consider 
these findings in the design of PPP contracts, particularly 
regarding the payment conditions of each project, as this is a 
critical condition for posterior renegotiation of contracts.1 
Key words: Mixed methods; fsQCA; public private 
partnerships; renegotiations; contract incompleteness. 
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Over the last few decades, a new form of collaboration between public and private organizations 
has emerged. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become extremely popular and relevant. 
These partnerships are long-term contracts (typically covering 30–40 years) with governments in 
which the private sector assures the construction of infrastructure and maintains a service for 
which the public sector pays.  
Public-private interaction and cross-sector partnerships (Boyer, Van Slyke, & Rogers, 2015) have 
increased, as have the strategic aspects of providing the delivery of public services through PPPs 
(Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Quelin, Cabral, Lazzarini, & Kivleniece, 2014). This recent concept 
brings new forms of organizational arrangements that lead to critical questions about 
organizational design, governance mechanisms, and institutional frameworks (Argyres & 
Liebeskind, 1999; Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Arino, Reuer, Mayer, & Jané, 2014). 
One of the most relevant topics in the strategic, organizational, and management of PPPs relates 
to renegotiations. These contracts are often subject to renegotiations when specific events 
change the financial conditions of the concession (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016a). According to 
Guasch (2004), a renegotiation of PPP contracts involves a change in the original contractual 
terms and conditions, as opposed to an adjustment that takes place under a mechanism defined in 
the contract. The literature on renegotiations has focused on studying the critical factors in 
renegotiations and the critical renegotiation triggers. 
The reason for renegotiations is that these long-term contracts require major investments and 
are necessarily incomplete. Renegotiations touch on several relevant topics in management 
theory: uncertainty embedded in long-term and incomplete contracts (contract theory), 
opportunistic behavior both from governments and private sector (theories from political 
economics), and the effect of regulation and corruption (legal and institutional theory).  
This study focuses on the contract theory. This literature shows that the degree of contract 
incompleteness induces more renegotiations; strong evidence exists of opportunistic behavior by 
both the public and private actors. However, fewer renegotiations occur in times of lower 
corruption and a stronger rule of law.  
Based on contract theory, we formulate the following hypothesis: Are more complex and long 
PPPs contracts a causal combination of conditions that lead to a higher number of renegotiations? 
But a lack of research exists in addressing the strategic aspects in the renegotiations of PPPs. 
And, no study uses mixed methods to examine PPP renegotiations, such as a fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) with a quantitative approach. The literature focuses on regression 
analyses that explain the probabilities, the net effects, or the marginal effects. The fsQCA has the 
advantage of identifying the causes of outcomes and the exploration of complex casual relations 
(Denscombe, 2008; Vis, 2012; Kan, Adegbite, El Omari, & Abdellatif, 2016).  




This study analyzes the contractual incompleteness of PPPs and the effect of contractual clauses 
on the occurrence of renegotiations. This work uses mixed methods as a way of developing the 
analysis and building on the initial findings. Several studies provide evidence that the fsQCA brings 
a more advance approach to providing explanations for specific outcomes (Ragin, 2000; 
Woodside, 2013) and for a phenomenon that has complex explanations (Wang, Yu, & Chiang, 
2016). This approach is also useful when dealing with a small number of observations (but also 
large samples), unlike regressions that require large samples (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010; Fiss, 
Sharapov, & Cronqvist, 2013).  
This study uses renegotiations of Portuguese PPPs. Portugal has set up many PPPs since 1993 and 
is the European leader (in terms of the large number of PPPs as a percentage of GDP, Sarmento 
& Reis, 2012). The analysis applies the mixed methods (fsQCA and regressions) to 35 PPP 
projects of which the partners renegotiated 26.  
Several causal combinations of conditions exist that lead to a higher number of renegotiations. 
The results show that longer contracts and domestic shareholders are necessary conditions for 
renegotiations. Also, higher investments, more leverage, and more bidders in the tendering 
process can be sufficient conditions for renegotiations.  
As PPPs become more frequent and as renegotiations increase, this study should be relevant to 
academics and practitioners for establishing better solutions for PPPs and public to private 
collaboration. The findings of this study contribute to the management literature on long-term 
contracts that involve both public and private actors. This study’s novelty comes from applying 
the fsQCA and a quantitative approach to the renegotiations in the PPP field.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the management literature on PPPs 
renegotiations. Section 3 presents the Portuguese experience with PPPs and renegotiations; 
Section 4 details the data and variables. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.  
Renegotiations 
Public-private partnerships 
The interest in the strategic aspects of PPPs and the organizational choices public and private 
actors make has increased (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Boyer et al., 2015). One of the main 
problematic issues with PPPs are their frequent renegotiations, which can arise at any stage in the 
lifecycle of a PPP (see Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016a, for details on how firms manage a PPP). 
The renegotiations occur when specific events change the financial conditions of the concession, 
which mainly occurs when the public authority proposes to compensate a firm for a loss of 
revenue or unanticipated costs during a project (Gausch, Laffont & Straub, 2003). Alternatively, 
the private sector can initiate renegotiations; this is mainly the case when the concession’s 




financial conditions deteriorate in such a way that the private company might slip into financial 
distress. 
One of the criticisms of PPPs is that the high rate of renegotiations undermines the credibility of 
the initial bids by the private sector. Bidding parties may anticipate renegotiations, which affects 
the bidding competition and thus the efficiency of PPPs. The PPP contracts are by nature more 
prone to renegotiations, because they are long-term, complex, and incomplete. In addition, they 
occur in heavily regulated sectors that are sensitive to political and circumstantial changes. These 
factors, combined with high levels of investment, result in greater uncertainty (Carson, Madhok 
and Wu, 2006,). Understanding the renegotiation process is a key aspect of PPP contracting, the 
more so as only few and geographically disperse studies have touched on this subject. 
Renegotiations of public-private partnerships 
In management theory, the focus has moved to efficiency and the performance of contractual 
relations (Kern, Willcocks, & van Heck, 2002) and less on how the actors design the contracts 
and how the contracts have evolved (Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007; Bercovitz & Tyler, 
2014). Weber and Mayer (2011) state that the research still disputes how a contract determines 
the ongoing relationship between parties. Successful alliance projects are highly evolutionary and 
have a sequence of interactive cycles of learning, re-evaluation, and readjustment (in contrast, 
failing projects lack learning and adjustment) (Doz, 1996; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Anand & Khanna, 
2000). Ideally, contractual arrangements for a PPP project should be dynamic and correspond to 
the evolution of risks as the future unfolds and new information dissipates uncertainty (Harrison, 
2004).  Contracts must provide the right incentives to fulfil obligations and lay the basis for 
dispute resolution in case one party reneges on its obligations (Argyres et al., 2007; Lumineau & 
Oxley., 2012). Regarding contract design, Mayer and Argyres (2004) argue that although 
renegotiations can be regarded as undesirable due to high transaction costs, a successful 
renegotiation can reduce the probability of future renegotiations in the decades to follow. They 
argue that this first renegotiation realigns the contract terms with the actors’ long-term 
expectations about the viability of the project. 
Unlike contract renegotiation theory (e.g., Grossman, & Hart, 1986; Williamson, 1989; Tirole, 
1999; Hart, 1990; Hart, 2003), the literature on PPPs and their renegotiations is not abundant 
because private firms rarely share information on their agreements and are even more unlikely to 
share information about their renegotiation decisions and outcomes. The empirical studies on 
renegotiations consider Guasch et al. (2003) as the seminal study on PPP renegotiations. The 
authors have subsequently expanded the study in several papers (Guasch, 2004; Guasch, Laffont, 
& Straub, 2007, 2008; Guasch & Straub, 2006; 2009). In the 2003 study, they analyzed 1,000 
South-American concessions over a period of nearly 20 years. The partners renegotiated 
approximately 75% of the PPPs in transportation and 90% of the water and sanitation PPPs.  
Estache, Guasch, and Trujillo (2003, 2009) also study South America. De Brux, (2010) and De 




Brux, Beuve, and Saussier (2011) have studied France. Cruz and Marques (2013) and Sarmento 
and Renneboog (2016b) analyze Portugal. Domingues & Sarmento (2016) study the transport 
sector in Europe. 
Antecedents of renegotiations 
All of these studies have looked at the contractual variables and their effect on the probability of 
renegotiations. Regarding the contractual variables, Guasch et al. (2003) report that higher 
investment and the presence of private sector financing reduces the occurrence of 
renegotiations. Also, the existence of a bidding process has a relation to more renegotiations. 
Renegotiations may also stem from the opportunistic behavior of private bidders who assume 
that renegotiations are likely to occur and therefore bid more aggressively (Williamson, 1989; 
Das & Teng, 1996, 1998). Longer contracts are also more prone to renegotiation. The other 
studies on the South-American experience show evidence of the effect of higher investment and 
long-term contracts in increasing renegotiations.  
Regarding the Portuguese experience, the studies have concluded that a higher investment, 
longer contracts, and more leverage increase the occurrence of renegotiations. Also, 
organizations tend to renegotiate PPPs more at the operational stage. Domingues and Sarmento 
(2016) make the same finding for the transport sector in Europe.  
The literature also presents evidence that the existence of a regulator and better institutional 
quality reduce the probability of renegotiation but that GDP growth, additional investments, 
upcoming elections, and a reduction in the corruption level increase it. A regulatory body 
reduces the effect of contract incompleteness by leaving less room for mistakes and 
uncertainties.  
Guasch and Straub (2006) and Guasch et al. (2007) differentiate the probability of firm-led and 
government-led renegotiations and confirm the importance of the above variables. They also 
show that additional investment requirements and corruption positively affect the probability of 
public sector renegotiation (with a negative effect on the private sector). They further show that 
exclusive private financing has a positive effect on the probability of private sector renegotiation 
(and a negative effect on the public sector). Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2009) study PPPs in 
Chile and find evidence that in a competitive market, firms lowball their offers with the 
expectation of breaking even through renegotiation, while governments use renegotiation to 
increase spending and shift the burden of payments to future administrations.  
The key issue is how to design better concession contracts through inducing both parties to 
comply with the agreed initial conditions. That way, this better design will reduce the probability 
of renegotiation, along with the opportunistic behavior of both parties. 
 




Literature gap and hypothesis 
The literature on PPPs renegotiation is mainly driven by country factors, such as the quality of 
the institutional, political and economic environment (Guasch et al., 2003; Estache et al., 2009; 
Cruz and Marques, 2013; Domingues and Sarmento, 2016; Athias and Saussier, 2018). These 
studies focus on how variables such as corruption, government, regulation, economic growth or 
elections impact on the probability of renegotiations. However, there is less literature on how 
contracts design impact on renegotiations. The complexity of contracts is a key issue on the 
occurrence of renegotiations, as it increases uncertainty in the long run. PPPs have particular 
characteristics that make them more prone to renegotiations, as they are long-term, complex, 
and incomplete contracts. Incomplete contract theory argues that renegotiations are the result of 
the need to adapt contracts to a changing environment or new conditions unforeseen in the 
initial agreement and that is requiring compensation for investments that were not foreseen in 
the contract and only became verifiable ex-post (Grossman & Hart, 1986). 
To address this issue, our research focuses only on contractual characteristics of PPPs. The 
duration of the contract and the inherent complexity. Therefore, based on contract theory, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: Are more complex and long PPPs contracts a causal 
combination of conditions that lead to a higher number of renegotiations? 
The Portuguese experience in PPPs 
Portugal has been a leading country concerning using PPPs, allowing for a substantial reduction in 
the “infrastructure gap” the country faced two decades ago, particularly in the road sector. 
Portugal has intensively used PPPs to build an extensive highway network. This network has 
increased by 700% between 1990 and 2007, similar to Ireland (+900%) and Greece (+500%) 
(Cruz and Marques, 2011). According to Sarmento and Reis (2012), two large waves of PPPs in 
the highway sector were launched: one between 1997 and 2001 and the other between 2007 and 
2010. The PPP model was chosen because these highways did not present sufficient traffic for 
being fully privatised (as the first wave of highways in the 80´s – see Sarmento and Renneboog, 
2015) and as Portugal entered the Eurozone fiscal constraints increased.  
In the health sector, four hospitals were built, with an innovator scheme were each hospital have 
two PPPs: one for the infrastructure (with a 30-year contract) and other for the medical services 
(with a 10-year contract).  
Portugal has the highest value of PPP investment as a percentage of GDP. Since 1993, Portugal 
has used PPPs in four sectors: health, security, railways, and highways. Of a total of 35 projects, 
22 are in the road sector, 10 in the health sector, 2 in railways, and 1 in security. A total of 20 
billion € has been invested in these projects, and the road sector accounts for 18 billion of these 
investments (Sarmento and Renneboog 2015). The intensive use of PPPs led to some concerns 
regarding affordability. The future payments represent an annual effort above 0.5% of GDP until 




almost 2030, while between 2014 and 2020 these payments will go up to 1% of GDP (Reis and 
Sarmento, 2017). There is a definite concern that PPPs were used for a “budget temptation” and 
not to create Value for Money (Sarmento, 2010).  
The intensive use of PPPs (and the purpose of it) lead to a large (and probably abnormal) number 
of renegotiations. This deserves further attention from PPPs research.  
All this makes the Portuguese experience relevant. We are using a unique dataset, covering a 
large number of renegotiations events for an extended period (more than 20 years). Portugal 
used PPPs in a very intensive way in different sectors, providing a rich experience and lessons for 
less developed PPPs markets. 
Methods 
Mixed methods 
In order to analyze the renegotiation process, this study uses a mixed-methods approach 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007; Creswell, 2013). The qualitative analysis is performed with an fsQCA to 
test several contractual conditions regarding the renegotiation of PPPs. This technique uses a 
theoretical approach to explore how casual conditions jointly link to an outcome of interest (Fiss, 
2011; Ferreira, Jalali, & Ferreira, 2016). The study measures the presence and absence of the 
outcome. 
In order to use the fsQCA, calibration must occur so that the levels can represent meaningful 
groups (Ragin, 2008; Crilly et al., 2012). According to Ragin (2008), this calibration requires a 
theoretical and empirical knowledge of the variables. The fsQCA requires the calibration of all 
variables into scales according to three breakpoints: 5%, 50%, and 95% of the data values (Ragin, 
2008). Following Ragin and Fiss (2008), the analysis of the outputs of the fuzzy truth table 
algorithm builds on the parsimonious and intermediate solutions. 
The study develops a quantitative approach to PPP renegotiations. Thus, the study performs an 
OLS that uses the number of renegotiations of each PPP as the dependent variable and the 
fsQCA conditions as predictors in a cross-section analysis. This analysis intends to observe how 
each condition affects the number of renegotiations by each firm. The data do not show 
multicollinearity. In order to avoid heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are used (see 
Hoechle, 2007; Wooldridge, 2010).  
Sample and variables 
The sample covers a total of 35 PPPs (of which 26 were renegotiated at least once) from 1995 to 
2012. The analysis hinges on a unique panel data set of 254 renegotiation events over the sample 
period. The data are hand-collected from the Ministry of Finance for each of the 35 reports. 




Although they are not publicly available, the previous Portuguese government granted access for 
the purpose of studying renegotiations (with a confidentiality agreement for individual cases). The 
study also collects information from the initial and renegotiated PPP contracts and their annexes, 
which are also not publicly available.  
The study uses Reneg to identify the outcome as the number of renegotiations from each of the 
26 PPPs. The ~Reneg represents the alternative outcome of no renegotiations in the 9 PPPs. 
In order to assess several casual combinations that can lead to renegotiations, this study uses the 
following contractual variables: 
payaval represents the type of payment that the PPP receives, with zero if the payment is based 
on service (demand) and one if a payment to the PPP is based on availability.  The availability of a 
PPP payment consists of a fixed annual rent, as long as the asset is in a condition to be used 
according to the contractual requirements. This type of payment is expected to decrease the 
occurrence of renegotiations because the demand risk has been allocated to the public sector. 
shardomest is a variable equal to zero if the majority of the equity capital is owned by foreign 
companies and one if the majority is owned by domestic companies. A majority stake of foreign 
shares may decrease the occurrence of renegotiations because these shareholders have less 
political connections. Political connections can indeed affect investment decisions. Fisman (2001) 
and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) show connections as “red” and “blue” US firms, that is, firms 
with Republican or Democratic ties, respectively. 
capex stands for the total investment required for each PPP. The higher it is, the higher the risk is 
for the owners of and lenders to PPPs. Large infrastructural projects are subject to more 
uncertainty regarding possible overruns in costs, especially during the construction period 
(Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg, & Rothengatter, 2002; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2002). In this regard, the 
levels of investment also increase the probability of renegotiations. 
debt is the percentage of the investment financed by debt (the project’s leverage). A high debt 
percentage represents the risk for the banking sector, which could increase the probability of 
renegotiations. Additionally, a high level of debt, despite being common in project finance can 
expose the project to shocks and crises in the financial markets, with consequences for the cost 
of debt and the financial sustainability of the project (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016a; Kim, Song, 
& Wang, 2017). 
The contractual variables are used in both analysis; they are considered causal conditions in the 
fsQCA, and they are used as predictors in the regression’s estimation. Table 1 presents the 
statistics of the variables, along with the calibration values used for the fsQCA. 





Statistic Reneg payaval shardomest capex debt 
Mean N/A N/A N/A 514.25 68.74 
St. Dev N/A N/A N/A 552.11 22.21 
Min 0 0 0 3 14 
Max 1 1 1 2781 97 
CALIBRATION (30;7;0) (*) (*) (1200;600;5) (95;75;20) 
     N/A – non applicable 
     * - 1 = full membership; 0 = full non-membership 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and calibration values 
Qualitative analysis and results 
First, the study addresses the necessary conditions for Reneg and its absence. According to Ragin 
(2000; 2008), a condition, or a combination of conditions, is necessary for the consistency score 
to exceed the threshold of 0.8.  
Using such a threshold shows that no necessary conditions exist for Reneg. However, two 
conditions exist for ~Reneg: the variables ~shar and ~capex. This is in line with the literature 
(Guasch et al., 2003, 2007; Guasch & Straub, 2006; De Brux et al., 2011; Domingues & Sarmento, 
2016) that finds that fewer renegotiations occur when foreign shareholders exist. Also, projects 
that use less investment are less uncertain, and therefore the results confirm such conditions are 
necessary conditions for the absence of renegotiations. 
The outcome Reneg and the conditions payaval and shardomest assume the values one for 
presence and zero for absence – they are crispy variables. The conditions capex and debt assume 
various values over a range, thus they need to be calibrated into a fuzzy set. Following Ragin and 
Fiss (2008), the casual combinations of conditions that exceed 0.8 are categorized as sufficient, 
with the outcome being assigned the value of one in the truth table. The casual combinations 
with a value below 0.8 are assigned the value of zero, as they are not considered sufficient. Such 
sorting generates the three solutions (complex, parsimonious, and intermediate). In order to 
check the solutions’ quality the consistency score should exceed the threshold of 0.8. (Ragin, 
2008). According to Wang et al. (2016), consistency means significance because of the existence 
of multiple configurations of antecedent conditions that are useful in predicting scores of an 
outcome condition. Coverage means strength that indicates the empirical relevance of a set-
theoretic connection. Woodside (2013) stresses the importance of achieving high consistency 
over achieving high coverage.  




Regarding the sufficient conditions sets, the study considers results for the intermediate and 
parsimonious solutions (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008) that are reported in a single table. Conditions 
present in both solutions are core conditions and are represented by large circles, whereas 
conditions only present in the intermediate solution are peripheral and are represented by small 
circles. Sufficient conditions for Reneg are presented in Table 2 and the ones leading to ~Reneg 
are presented in Table 3. The results in both tables respect the consistency cut-off of 0.8. The 
results show that two sufficient conditions sets lead to Reneg and three lead to ~Reneg, which 
offers alternative ways to keep PPPs from renegotiation. 
  
   Coverage   Consistency 
 
Configurations payaval shardomest capex debt  Raw Unique   
1 ◦ ◦    0.24     0.24      0.91 
2 •     0.15 0.15  0.87 
Overall Solution coverage: 0.38 
Overall Solution consistency: 0.90 
Reneg = ; debt = ; capex = ; shareholders = ; payment = ; full black circles (•) indicate the presence 
of a condition, and center white circles (◦) indicate its absence. Large circles indicate core 
conditions; small ones, peripheral conditions.  
Table 2: Sufficient conditions sets (Reneg) 
Model: fsreneg = f(fsdebt, fscapex, shardomest, cripayaval) 
  Coverage Consistency 
Configurations payaval shardomest capex debt  Raw Unique   
1      0.71     0.59      0.88 
2      0.19 0.07  0.82 
3      0.07 0.07  0.86 
Overall Solution coverage: 0.85 
Overall Solution consistency: 0.86 
Reneg = ; debt = ; capex = ; shareholders = ; payment = ; full black circles (•) indicate the presence 
of a condition, and center white circles (◦) indicate its absence. Large circles indicate core 
conditions; small ones, peripheral conditions. Blank spaces indicate “don’t care.” 
 
Table 3: Sufficient conditions sets (~Reneg) 
Model: ~fsreneg = f(fsdebt, fscapex, cri shardomest, cripayaval) 




Quantitative analysis and results 
Regarding the quantitative analysis, Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis. The 
results confirm the previous results. The foreign shareholders reduce the number of 
renegotiations. Also, projects with higher investment tend to request renegotiations more 
frequently. The regression analysis also shows that PPPs with the availability payment have less 
uncertainty regarding future revenues that reduce the frequency of renegotiations. In contrast, 













Wald test 0.00 
Observations 35 
R-squared 0.37 
                                       Robust standard errors in parentheses 
                                       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Regression estimation 
Discussion  
The findings of this study reveal the conditions sets that lead to renegotiation (Table 2) and finds 
two conditions for Reneg: ~payaval *~shar*capex*~debt, and payaval*shar*~capex*debt. 




The study finds three conditions sets that lead to the absence of renegotiations: ~capex*~shar, 
debt*~shar*~ payaval, and debt*capex*shar* payaval. These three sets are core conditions for no 
renegotiation. 
These results show that despite the high number of renegotiations in Portugal, solutions exist 
that can mitigate the occurrence of renegotiations. The PPPs that tend not to be renegotiated 
are: a) those with low investment and foreign shareholders; b) those with larger debt, foreign 
shareholders, and demand payments; and c) more investment with larger debt that is associated 
with domestic shareholders and the availability payment. These results are in line with the 
literature (Guasch et al., 2007; Guasch & Straub, 2006; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016b; 
Domingues & Sarmento, 2016). 
In contrast, the pitfalls of renegotiations are: a) PPPs with a demand payment with foreign 
shareholders, larger investment, and lower leverage; and b) PPPs with the availability payment, 
domestic shareholders, less investment, and more leverage. The solution leading to Reneg 
presents just two configurations, each involving core and peripheral conditions. Such results 
contrast with the ~Reneg solution with only core conditions, and thus are more pertinent. 
For managerial purposes, these are encouraging results, as they present more solutions to avoid 
the main pitfall in PPPs: renegotiations. 
Conclusions 
As the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) has increased, the issue of the renegotiations of 
these long and incomplete contracts have become extremely relevant. In order to analyze the 
contractual variables and causal combinations of conditions that lead to a higher number of 
renegotiations, this paper applies a fsQCA model to Portugal’s PPPs. This is the first study to use 
a fsQCA in the PPP context. 
This study shows that contractual determinants are relevant for the occurrence of 
renegotiations. This study provides strong evidence that the degree of contract incompleteness 
influences renegotiations, which confirms the literature on this topic. Further, evidence exists 
that the private sector responds to more risk with a higher incidence of renegotiations. Also, the 
type of shareholders in the private firm is relevant. The PPPs with domestic shareholders have 
more ties to political agents, and hence frequently renegotiate the majority of the capital.  
Contract theory shows that uncertainty plays a relevant role in renegotiations. The results 
provide evidence that longer contracts are more subject to renegotiations. Further, some 
evidence exists that firms more frequently renegotiate more complex projects (measured by the 
level of investment).    




This paper contributes to the management literature on long-term contracts that involve both 
public and private parties. As PPPs are becoming more frequent, and renegotiations are 
increasing, this paper should be relevant for both academics and practitioners. This paper also 
brings novelty to the current literature on the renegotiations in the PPP field. No previous 
literature has addressed renegotiations by means of a mixed methods analysis. The literature on 
PPP renegotiations has mainly addressed the determinants of the probability for renegotiation. 
This study goes a step further and analyzes what conditions are necessary and what conditions 
are sufficient for a PPP renegotiation. The use of a fsQCA enables the identification of 
combinations of attributes associated with more renegotiations.   
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